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Abstract
The aftermath of the Global nancial crisis has seen two types of monetary policy
concerns. Some economists (e.g. Paul Krugman) worry primarily about possible de-
ation caused by a secular stagnation. In contrast, others (e.g. John Taylor) worry
about excessively high ination caused by quantitative easing and monetization of scal
imbalances. We show that some countries should fear both - deation in the short term
and high ination in the long term - whereas some countries are unlikely to experience
either. This is done in a game theoretic framework with dynamic leadership (stochastic
revisions of actions). Such framework enables us to examine strategic monetary-scal in-
teractions as well as policymakersincomplete information about the economic recovery
(such as during 2010-2014). Our empirical section then quanties indices of monetary
and scal leadership for high-income countries to assess their deationary/inationary
prospects. It is shown, for example, that undesirable departures from price stability,
both in the short term and long term, are much more likely in the United States and
Japan than in Australia or New Zealand.
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scal stress; deation; active/passive policy
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equilibrium selection. JEL Classication Numbers: E63, C70.
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1. Introduction
The post Global nancial crisis (GFC) period of 2010-2014 has presented policymakers
all over the globe with major challenges. In the monetary policy arena, high uncertainty
about economic conditions has made it di¢ cult to assess the threats that: (i) under-
performing economies may fall into a deationary trap in the short term; and that (ii)
recent scal and monetary actions combined with unfavourable demographic trends may
have inationary consequences in the long term.3
In terms of the short term, the unemployment rate in the United States over 2010-2014
has been far above its natural rate despite interest rates at zero. Coupled with GDP
growth rates and ination consistently below the historical average this led to fears of
a Japanese style prolonged slump. In terms of the long term, the balance sheet of the
Federal Reserve increased in size more than fourfold during the GFC (from 8% to well
over 20% of GDP) and the Congressional Budget O¢ ces projections show steadily rising
debt into the future. The situation in the rest of the advanced world is similar, whereby
the World Economic Forum ranked scal crisesas the number one global risk in terms
of the perceived nancial losses (ahead of climate change and asset price collapse).4
We model both the short-run and long-run aspects of a post-downturn situation -
focusing on the strategic interactions between the monetary and scal policymakers.
The developments of the post-GFC period suggest that strategic considerations may be
crucial in determining the outcomes of both policies - even if the central bank is formally
independent from the government. For example, the European Central Banks initial
resistance to quantitative easing, and its subsequent change of view suggest that formal
modelling of strategic monetary-scal interactions may produce novel insights. The
importance of such interactions is likely to grow over time as countries face increasing
scal stress from aging populations.
The main contribution of the paper is showing - via novel game theoretic methods -
how institutional design of monetary and scal policy and uncertainty about the econ-
omys recovery may a¤ect the strategic policy interaction and the resulting departures
from price stability. This qualitative analysis is complemented by a quantitative assess-
ment in order to better predict short-term and long-term monetary and scal policy
outcomes in advanced countries. Importantly, our ndings are used to formulate policy
recommendations for the post-GFC period. This is not only for single countries but
also for currency unions such as the European monetary union, based on their formal
examination in Section 7.
Let us be clear up-front: this is not a conventionalmacro paper. As strategic inter-
actions cannot be captured in standard microfounded models, we use instead a dynamic
game with stochastic revisions of policy actions [developed in Libich and Stehlík (2011)].
As such, the paper answers Leepers (2010) call for more dynamic modelling of the
policy interaction at the game theoretic level rather than the macroeconomic level. Nev-
ertheless, our results indicate that this type of dynamics deserves research attention.
3The paper does not examine the heat of the GFC itself (the 2008-2009 period), but rather the
aftermath of the crisis (the 2010-2014 period). This is because in the former period there was little
disagreement regarding desirable macroeconomic policy actions - virtually all countries implemented
both monetary and scal stimuli.
4Appendix A provides a discussion of scal stress in advanced countries.
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Furthermore, or generalized timing of moves and incomplete information enable us to
follow Leepers plea for more attention to information and uncertainty ... and more
focus on institutional design.
2. Summary of the Setup, Findings, and Policy Implications
Our monetary vs scal interaction is a game between the central bank and the gov-
ernment featuring two main problems observed in the post-GFC period. The long-term
problem is existence of an intertemporal budgetary shortfall [the so-called scal gap,
see Kotliko¤ (2006)]. The short-term problem is an underperforming economy following
an adverse shock.
Economic Uncertainty and Policy Conict. The solution of both problems is
made di¢ cult by two facts. First, the policymakers are uncertain about the economys
recovery prospects. Specically, with probability (1  p) they believe that economic
conditions will keep improving, and the economy recovers at a good pace without any
additional stimulatory measures. This is our Normal timesscenario. In contrast, with
probability p economic conditions are such that a prolonged slump and deation are
imminent in the absence of additional policy stimulus. This is our Downturnscenario.
While we assume that the two policymakers have the same estimate of (an exogenous)
p, we do not restrict this value. This reects the fact that in the real world it varies over
the business cycle.
The second complication is that, due to the presence of a large scal gap, mone-
tary and scal policymakers have conicting objectives. In particular, each policymaker
prefers the other policy to deal with the underlying problem: the weak recovery in
the short term and the scal imbalance in the long term. Therefore, our analysis can
roughly be interpreted as examining the following question: Which policy, if any, will
be inducedto deal with the short-term threat of a double-dip recession, and which with
the long-term scal shortfall? This embeds both a conict and a coordination problem
of the monetary and scal authorities, which is why the Normal times and Downturn
scenarios take the form of the Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes respectively.5
Timing of Policy Actions. Our methodological innovation based on Libich and
Stehlík (2011) is to generalize the timing of the game allowing for arbitrary (stochastic
or deterministic) revisions of moves. Specically, after an initial simultaneous move (one
of) the policymakers can revise the previous policy stance with some probability - but
5A number of monetary-scal interaction papers have the conict and/or coordination features, for
example Adam and Billi (2008, 2006), Branch, et al. (2008), Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), Dixit and
Lambertini (2003a,b), Bassetto (2002), Barnett (2001), Blake and Weale (1998), Nordhaus (1994), Sims
(1994), Woodford (1994), Leeper (1991), Petit (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), or Sargent and
Wallace (1981). While these papers contain a wide range of modelling approaches and macroeconomic
environments, our insights relate to their common conict/coordination features, and are therefore ap-
plicable to all these papers. An earlier version of this paper, Libich, Nguyen, and Stehlík (2012), shows
how the Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes can be derived under reasonable circumstances
from a standard intertemporal budget constraint of the government and conventional quadratic policy
preferences, as e.g. postulated in Leeper and Walker (2011).
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not necessarily with certainty, and only with a delay.6 This is in contrast to the standard
repeated game in which moves are made simultaneously every period, alternating move
games of Maskin and Tirole (1988) in which players move every other period, or the
Stackelberg leadership in which the revision is immediate. Neither of these existing
setups seems realistic in the monetary and scal policy context.
Our timing implies that, in contrast to the standard Stackelberg leadership concept
which is static, our leadership concept is dynamic. In particular, in the standard frame-
work the follower can revise his action without delay, i.e. there is no cost to the leader
from mis-coordination or conict. In contrast, our framework allows for such costs as
the revision opportunity may arrive later in the game and payo¤s accrue over time.
Equilibrium Outcomes. Our analysis shows how the equilibrium regimes, both
short term and long term, depend on (i) the various costs and benets of conict and
coordination, (ii) the probability p of being in the Downturn scenario, and most in-
terestingly (iii) the policiesrelative inability to change their previous stance. This is
because this inability determines which policy imposes itself as the leader in the game,
and how strongly so. Specically, we identify three equilibrium regions determined by
the monetary leadershipscal leadership ratio:
(1) Monetary-dominance - the central bank is the leader and this ratio is above a
threshold TF ;
(2) Fiscal-dominance - the government is the leader and this ratio is below a di¤erent
threshold (that is a mirror image of TF );
(3) Regime-switching - the ratio is in the intermediate interval.
In the Monetary-dominance case inationary scal spillovers will surely be avoided in
the long-run. This is because strong monetary leadership gives the central bank ammu-
nition to counter-act an excessive scal stance. This region is implicitly assumed by most
existing papers. In contrast, in the Fiscal-dominance case inationary scal spillovers
will surely occur in Normal times because scal leadership gives the government an up-
per hand in the policy tug-of-war. The monetary exit will be unsuccessful, similarly to
the intuition of Sargent and Wallaces (1981) unpleasant arithmetic and Leepers (1991)
scal theory of the price level. Importantly, we show how in both dominance regions
deation is prevented in the short-term equilibrium. This is because the dominant pol-
icy can indirectly induce the dominated policy to provide the required stimulus in the
Downturn scenario.
The Regime-switching region is of particular interest as it does not exist under static
(Stackelberg) leadership. In this region leadership no longer ensures a players dom-
inance. One policy is still the leader in the game, but insu¢ ciently so to force the
opponent to cooperate. This increases the likelihood of a policy tug-of-war, which is
costly for both policymakers and society. The conict has the form of a waiting game;
both policies delay required actions hoping to induce the other policy to carry them out.
In the Downturn scenario they postpone necessary (conventional or unconventional)
stimulatory measures making a double-dip recession accompanied by deation likely. In
6The timing of the revision opportunity, described by an arbitrary probability distribution, is as-
sumed exogenous and common knowledge, but it can be easily postulated as private information and/or
endogenized.
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Normal times they postpone dealing with the scal gap which brings the economy closer
to a scal crisis and debt monetization.
This means that countries in the Regime-switching region are more likely to see both
deation in the short term and high ination in the long term compared to those in the
Monetary-dominance region.7 Furthermore, we nd that under realistic circumstances
the threshold TF is increasing in p. Therefore, a certain degree of monetary leadership
that is su¢ cient to shelter monetary policy from scal pressures, and ensure price sta-
bility in Normal times, may be insu¢ cient in the aftermath of a downturn such as the
GFC. None of these ndings can be obtained under static leadership, which highlights
the importance of using dynamic leadership to avoid inaccurate policy prescriptions.
Policy Implications. In Section 6 we relate our ndings to the real world. We
develop summary indices of scal and monetary leadership based on twelve existing
institutional measures in the literature. The analysis shows that while countries such
as Australia and New Zealand seem safely in the Monetary-dominance region, countries
such as the United States and Japan are likely in the Fiscal-dominance or Regime-
switching regions. This implies a higher probability of both short-term deation and
long-term high ination in the U.S. and Japan than in Australia or New Zealand.
Our analysiss main implication for monetary policy in the aftermath of the GFC is
as follows. In order to minimize the probability of both deation in the short-term, and
of subsequent inationary scal spillovers (i.e.maximize the credibility of a monetary
exit from the GFC), the central bank should be as strongly committed as possible in the
long-term to achieve the Monetary-dominance region. Such strong monetary leadership
acts as a credibility insuranceover the business cycle, as it delivers price stability for
all values of the Downturn probability p.
In practice, monetary leadership has been implemented through a legislated numeri-
cal target for average ination. A recommendation to adopt such explicit commitment
has been made by a number of economists, both for short-run and long-run reasons,
e.g. Bernanke (2003), Goodfriend (2005), Hamilton (2008), or Walsh (2009). For exam-
ple, Mishkin (2010) argued, in line with our ndings, that By establishing an ination
objective ... the Fed can guard against both of these problems. Providing a rm anchor
for long-run ination expectations would make the threat of deation less likely. But a
rm anchor would ... [make] an upward surge in ination expectations less likely too.
The fact that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) subscribed to the 2% long-
term ination target more explicitly in its January 2012 statement may have had these
motives.8
Interestingly, our analysis implies that an explicit monetary commitment may im-
prove not only monetary outcomes, but also scal outcomes. By reducing the structural
incentives of the government to spend excessively through a credible threat of a policy
conict, stronger monetary leadership can under some circumstances discipline scal
7It is important to note that this result is not due to the short-term economic problems spilling over
to the long-term (i.e. the attempts to stimulate the weak economy contributing to a scal crisis). The
result is due to the political and institutional characteristics in some countries prone to a monetary-scal
policy conict, leading to departures from price stability in both directions over the business cycle.
8It is important to note that the commitment to low average ination does not need to be focused
on consumer prices, but can in principle use a broader measure of ination.
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policy and induce necessary scal reforms. We report below some empirical evidence for
this disciplining e¤ect.
Nevertheless, in our extension to the case of a monetary union in Section 7 we identify
an important caveat. If a free-riding problem exists in the union, whereby some govern-
ments do not internalize the negative externality their scal proigacy imposes on other
union members, then even an innitely strong leadership of the common central bank
may be ine¤ective in disciplining small free-riding governments. We show that in such
case some countries in the union are likely to experience deation in the short-term, and
the union as a whole may experience higher ination in the long-term.
The policy implication is that countries considering accession to a monetary union
have to factor in the possible reduction of the central banks disciplining inuence on
scal policy. And therefore design their scal rules more carefully to o¤set this reduction.
3. The Policy Interactions Under Incomplete Information
Our attempt is to capture the key characteristics of the strategic monetary-scal
interaction in the post-GFC situation. We spell out eight assumptions that arguably
apply to the 2010-2014 period and have implications for macroeconomic outcomes.9
Despite our e¤orts, formalizing all these assumptions in a microfounded macro model -
in a way that allows one to examine strategic policy interactions - seems impossible. We
therefore focus on the game theoretic insights without postulating an underlying macro
model.10 Nevertheless, we are transparent in the sense of spelling out all our assumptions
and justifying them with reference to the 2010-2014 global economic situation. Further,
Section 7 discusses extensively how our ndings relate to this situation and formulates
some policy recommendations.
Monetary (M) and scal (F ) policy can engage in an active (A) or passive (P )
stance, which is summarized in the following 22 game of incomplete information (with
a; :::; z0 denoting the payo¤s)
(1)
F
PF AF
M AM a;w b; x
PM c; y d; z
Normal times: probability 1  p
F
PF 0 AF 0
M AM 0 a0; w0 b0; x0
PM 0 c0; y0 d0; z0
Downturn: probability p
Consider the Normal times scenario depicted in the left part of (1). Following the
intuition of Leeper (1991), the A policy stance does not provide a (su¢ cient) adjust-
ment to balance the long-term budget constraint, whereas the P policy stance does.
9Some of the assumptions do not necessarily apply to the peak of the crisis itself, i.e. the 2008-2009
period. As stated above, we are however interested in the aftermath of an adverse shock such as the
2010-2014 period, in which uncertainty about the recovery and about the optimal monetary and scal
policy mix becomes a major issue.
10Interested readers can see an earlier version, Libich, Nguyen, and Stehlík (2012), which o¤ers
a simple macro setup featuring standard quadratic policy preferences and an intertemporal budget
constraint of the government based on Leeper and Walker (2011). It shows how the game theoretic
representation of (1) including the payo¤s can be derived from the macro model. While this analysis
o¤ers the intuition, it is too much of a reduced-formand lacks macroeconomic dynamics. We therefore
do not reproduce it here and focus on the dynamics embedded in the game with stochastic revisions.
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Specically, passive scal policy PF can solve the budgetary problem in Normal times
via a scal reform in which future government expenditures and taxes are aligned.11 As
a partial substitute, passive monetary policy PM can balance the budget constraint by
inating the accumulated debt away as per Sargent and Wallace (1981).
In the Downturn scenario shown in the right part of (1), PM 0 can thus be interpreted
as monetary stimulus due to its short-term expansionary e¤ect. Similarly, AF 0 represents
a scal stimulus since government expenditures exceed tax revenues.
3.1. Normal Times. We make the following assumptions about the Normal times sce-
nario (which is expected by both policymakers to occur with probability 1   p). First,
there exists a sizeable scal gap - unfunded public liabilities mandated by the existing
legislation. This is uncontroversial given the observed demographic trends, see Appen-
dix A for some data and a discussion. Second, we assume that in the Normal times
equilibrium the budget constraint has to be satised, i.e. one policy must be passive.
This e¤ectively rules out default on debt as an ongoing long-term solution to the scal
imbalance. Third, both policymakers prefer the other policy to play P and balance the
budget constraint, i.e. a > d and z > w. This is because the central bank dislikes sys-
temic deviations from price stability, and the government dislikes reneging on promised
transfers to the public.
The assumptions imply that while in the (AM;PF ) and (PM;AF ) regimes the bud-
get constraint is balanced by scal and monetary policies respectively, in the (AM;AF )
regime neither policy is adjusted. Therefore, debt is on an explosive path, both in nom-
inal and real terms, and the latter regime cannot be an equilibrium in Normal times.
Formally, this implies b < min fa; dg and x < min fw; zg. Finally, in the (PM;PF )
regime both policies attempt to balance the budget constraint in an uncoordinated fash-
ion. Therefore, real debt is actually falling due to excessive ination which is in no
players interest. Formally, we have c < min fa; dg and y < fw; zg.
Combining the above, our three assumptions mean that the payo¤s in (1) satisfy
(2) a > d > max fb; cg and z > w > max fx; yg :
The following payo¤ matrix o¤ers a numerical example, with the Nash equilibria indi-
cated in bold
(3)
F
PF AF
M AM
Ricardian
3;2
explosive (tug-of-war)
1; 1
PM
mis-coordination
0; 0
monetization (spillovers)
2;3
Game of Chicken
It is apparent that the Normal times scenario has the structure of the Game of Chicken.
The intuition of this game closely resembles the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of
Sargent and Wallace (1981). There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, each preferred
11Note that PF can also be interpreted as an intertemporarily balanced budget (including factors
such as the governments implicit guarantees for nancial institutions). This is in line with Leeper and
Walker (2011) who highlight the importance of building in the possibility of adopting a policy rule that
incorporates a balanced budget.
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by a di¤erent player. The central bank wants to deliver stable prices, and an intertem-
porarily balanced budget allows the bank to do so. Therefore, the bank prefers the
socially optimal Ricardianregime (AM;PF ). In contrast, the government prefers to
avoid necessary scal reforms for political economy reasons, and would like the central
bank to inate the accumulated debt away. Therefore, the governments preferred out-
come is the non-Ricardianregime (PM;AF ).12 If the policymakers do not coordinate
their actions, for example if they play the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, they get
inferior o¤-diagonal outcomes for at least some part of the game.
3.2. Downturn. Attempting to capture the GFC environment we make the following
ve assumptions about the Downturn scenario (which is believed by the policymakers
to occur with probability p).
First, as adverse economic conditions continue, the economy requires a potent expan-
sionary response in order to fully recover. If neither policy responds, or we only have
a Ricardian type response in which future taxes are expected to rise, the economy ex-
periences a prolonged recession and possibly a deationary trap. Formally, this means
a0 < min fb0; c0g and w0 < fx0; y0g.
Second, monetary and scal policies are (partial) substitutes in providing the required
stimulus. This can be interpreted both in terms of conventional policies (lower interest
rates and higher government spending respectively), as well as unconventional ones (the
central banks quantitative easing, QE, and governments debt management). In terms
of the latter Barro (2010) notes:My conclusion is that QE2 may be a short-term ex-
pansionary force, thereby lessening concerns about deation. However, the Treasury can
produce identical e¤ects by changing the maturity structure of its outstanding debts.
Third, the intertemporal budget constraint may not be satised in the Downturn
equilibrium. As a justication of this assumption, see e.g.Davig and Leepers (2010) es-
timates showing the occurrence of the active/active regime under U.S. President Reagan
and Fed Chairman Volcker.13
Fourth, we assume that a joint expansionary response of the policies, (PM 0; AF 0),
may be excessive and over-heat the economy, potentially planting seeds for imbalances
in the future. This assumption can be motivated by the developments following the burst
of the NASDAQ dot-com bubble, e.g. Taylor and Ryan (2010) argue: The Feds decision
to hold interest rates too low for too long from 2002 to 2004 exacerbated the formation
of the housing bubble.14 This assumption implies d0 < min fb0; c0g and z0 < min fx0; y0g.
Fifth, both policymakers prefer the other policy to stabilize the shock: the central
bank prefers (AM 0; AF 0), whereas the government prefers (PM 0; PF 0). Formally, b0 >
c0 and x0 < y0. This is because the policymakers understand that their additional
12Such government preferences can be derived from an overlapping generations model with an aging
population. See Kuehnel (2011) for formal modelling of how this shifts political power from the young to
the old. Davig and Leeper (2010) show that since 1985 the Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes were
most prevalent in the U.S., which also indicates the Game of Chicken.
13This assumption, together with the rst, are the two key di¤erences between the Normal times and
Downturn scenarios.
14Similar concerns can be heard about the policy behaviour in the post-GFC period, e.g. Rajan
(2011). They are highlighted by the striking near perfect positive correlation between the size of the
Feds balance sheet and U.S. stock indices since 2009.
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stimulatory measures jeopardize the pursuit of their preferred Normal times regime once
the Downturn threat is over. For example, central banks may resist further QE on the
grounds that it will make the subsequent exit strategy harder and less credible. As
Barro (2010) argues: The downside of QE2 is that it intensies the problems of an
exit strategy aimed at avoiding the inationary consequences of the Feds vast monetary
expansion. Similarly, additional conventional scal measures deteriorate the long-run
scal position, and make it di¢ cult for the government to engage in politically popular
spending programs in the future. The same is true for unconventional scal measures
that increase the debt rollover risk.
The following remarks from Fed Chairman Bernanke (2011) clearly express the mon-
etary preference for (AM 0; AF 0), that is, b0 > c0: I have advocated that the negotiations
about the budget focus on the longer term ... in light of the weakness of the recovery, it
would be best not to have sudden and sharp scal consolidation in the near term. That
doesnt do so much for the long-run budget situation, its a negative for growth.
It is straightforward to see that our ve assumptions of the Downturn scenario imply
(4) b0 > c0 > max

a0; d0
	
and y0 > x0 > max

w0; z0
	
:
A numerical example is o¤ered in the following payo¤ matrix
(5)
F
PF 0 AF 0
M AM 0
deation
0; 0
recovery
3;2
PM 0
recovery
2;3
over-stimulating
1; 1
Battle of the Sexes
which constitutes the Battle of the Sexes game.
3.3. Equilibria Using Standard Timing Setups. A large body of the policy inter-
actions literature (see footnote 5) features both a coordination problem and a policy
conict. They thus point to the Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes. While
the former is an anti-coordination game and the latter is a coordination game, they are
similar. Both have two Pareto-e¢ cient pure strategy Nash equilibria, each preferred by
a di¤erent player, and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-inferior to
both pure Nash equilibria - for both players.
What is the solution of these games? Under simultaneous moves, neither standard nor
evolutionary game theory provide a way of selecting between the pure Nash equilibria
in the Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes due to the symmetry. The Pareto-
inferior mixed Nash with regime switching is therefore a possibility in both games, and
a reason for concern.15 To o¤er some clarity, a common solution has been to apply
Stackelberg leadership. Most famously, Sargent and Wallace (1981) focus on the case
of the government being the Stackelberg leader in the Normal times situation, and the
central bank the follower. Leadership gives the government an upper hand and enables
it to achieve its preferred policy regime by forcing the central bank into a monetary
15There exists evidence of regime switching in the United States. Davig and Leepers (2010) paper
shows over a dozen regime switches in the U.S. since 1950, with all four our Normal times policy regimes
present.
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solution to the scal gap. In the alternative case of Monetary-dominance the opposite
is true and such unpleasant monetary arithmetic is avoided.
The next section generalizes the Stackelberg leadership concept from static to dy-
namic, and shows that these conventional ndings are rened and partly qualied.
4. Generalized Timing of Moves
Macroeconomic models have commonly been studied using a one-shot game, or its
repeated analog. In both of these settings playersmoves are always simultaneous, which
is arguably unrealistic in the macroeconomic policy context.16 In order to relax such
synchronicity assumption and incorporate institutional characteristics we will generalize
the timing as follows:
(1) Expecting the Downturn and Normal times scenarios with probability p and 1 p
respectively, the players move simultaneously at time t = 0.
(2) One of the players, called reviser, can move again in time t  0 with some (ex-
ante known) positive probability. The player does so observing the initial play
of the opponent, called the leader, who has to stick to his initial choice to the
end of the dynamic stage game (normalized to t = 1).
(3) Payo¤s accrue continuously over t 2 [0; 1].
Our framework allows for an arbitrary timing of the revision opportunity. The top
panels of Figure 1 o¤er three examples: normal, uniform, and binomial distributions, the
latter in line with the popular Calvo (1983) scheme.17
Section 6 relates real world institutional characteristics to this timing. It implies that
in countries with a high degree of scal leadership (a large scal gap) and weak monetary
leadership (absence of a legislated ination target) the government will have the role of
the leader. It is able to reconsider its scal stance (at most) once a year in the proposed
budget, whereas the central bank as the reviser is able to reconsider its monetary stance
every 4-6 weeks at its regular meeting. This can be depicted as the right panel of Figure
1 where the time frame of the game t = 1 can then be interpreted as one year.
In contrast, in countries in which the scal gap is small and monetary commitment
is explicitly legislated the central bank is no longer a reviser; it becomes the leader in
the game. For example, the Policy Target Agreement in New Zealand species that the
ination target can only be altered when a new government or central bank Governor
take o¢ ce, i.e. roughly every four years. In such case, the players roles in the right
16It should be noted that most existing micro-founded macroeconomic models implicitly assume a
simultaneous move. This is because monetary and scal policies, like expectations, can be adjusted every
period.
17In the game theoretic paper Basov, Libich, and Stehlík (2013) we allow both players to revise their
initial actions on t 2 [0; 1]. While the solution of the game is more complex, the intuition is similar
because what matters is the players relative inability to revise actions. Let us also note that while
the dynamic stage game can be repeated, we do not do so since our focus is on deriving circumstances
under which the dynamic stage game itself has a unique and e¢ cient subgame perfect equilibrium. In
such case repetition does not alter the outcomes. Nevertheless, allowing for reputation building would
have the standard e¤ects of improving coordination and reducing the probability of inferior outcomes,
see Mailath and Samuelson (2006). Libich and Stehlík (2011) o¤er a detailed mathematical treatment
of several specic timing distributions, including their combinations. They also discuss the di¤erences
from stochastic gamesof Shapley (1953).
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Figure 1. Three examples of timing: truncated normal, uniform, and
binomial distributions (top panels), and their corresponding cummulative
distribution functions as per Denition 1 (bottom panels).
panel of Figure 1 are reversed and the government is the reviser. The time frame of the
game t   1 becomes four years whereby the governments annual budgets serve as its
revision opportunities. The following denition describes several related concepts used
in our analysis.
Denition 1. (i) The cumulative distribution function (CDF) summarizes the proba-
bility that by time t the reviser has had a revision opportunity (see the bottom panels of
Figure 1). We call it the revision function, and denote it by Ri(t), where i 2 fM;Fg
is the reviser.
(ii) Based on is revision speed we will distinguish three cases:
(6)
Z 1
0
Ri(t)dt
8<: = 1 (standard) static leadership,2 (0; 1) dynamic leadership,
= 0 (standard) simultaneous move.
(iii) The reciprocal of the complementary CDF,
1R 1
0 (1 Ri(t)) dt
2 [1;1];
expresses the leaders degree of leadership - relative to reviser i.18
The setup makes clear that the standard frameworks of simultaneous moves and Stack-
elberg leadership are only extreme cases. This calls into question the robustness of
conventional results.
18Naturally, we have
R 1
0
(1 Ri(t)) dt = 1 
R 1
0
Ri(t)dt:
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5. Results
In order to highlight the e¤ect of dynamic leadership representing institutional factors
and constraints, we compare them to the standard simultaneous move game and the
static leadership.
5.1. Simultaneous Moves. This is our special case
R 1
0 Ri(t)dt = 0 whereby there is
no area below the CDF. The playerspayo¤ from each regime is a weighted average of
those in Downturn and Normal times with p as the weight, e.g. a00 = (1  p) a + pa0. It
is apparent that even if (2) and (4) hold, i.e. the underlying games are known to be the
Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes, under incomplete information we may
have many di¤erent classes of games. The ranking of the regimes by each policymaker
depends on the exact values of the payo¤s in the two scenarios and the probability p.
Hence there is a large number of possible (Bayesian Nash) equilibria. The implication
can be summarized as follows.
Remark 1. Uncertainty about the business cycle compounds the coordination problem
between monetary and scal policy.
5.2. Static Leadership. This is our case
R 1
0 Ri(t)dt = 1 whereby the revision is im-
mediate so there is no area above the CDF. Under both static and dynamic leadership,
we are interested in deriving the circumstances under which the leader fully dominates,
i.e. the dynamic stage game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ preferred
by the leader.
Proposition 1. (i) (Fiscal-dominance) Under static scal leadership, inationary
scal spillovers onto monetary policy occur under all circumstances in the long-term,
i.e. for any p and any payo¤s satisfying (2) and (4).
(ii) (Monetary-dominance) Under static monetary leadership, scal spillovers onto
monetary policy occur under no circumstances in the long-term.
(iii) Under static leadership, deation occurs under no circumstances in the short-term.
The long-term part of the proposition is in line with Sargent and Wallace (1981), in
which leadership is an advantage that allows to force the opponent into compliance. The
intuition of the short-run game is analogous: the leader can induce the follower to attend
to the temporary economic weakness by a stimulus, so a double-dip recession caused by
a policy conict does not occur.
5.3. Dynamic Leadership. This section shows that while the intuition of Proposition
1 still applies the results are not robust under more general timing. It will become
apparent that static leadership may provide misleading predictions, e.g. it down-plays
the possibility of deation arising from a policy tug-of-war. This is because leadership,
while necessary, is not su¢ cient to ensure a players dominance.
Proposition 2. (i) (Fiscal-dominance) Under dynamic scal leadership, inationary
scal spillovers onto monetary policy surely occur if and only if the ratio of monetary
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vs scal leadership is su¢ ciently low,
(7)
1R 1
0 (1 RM (t)) dt
> TM =
Fs weighted conict costsz }| {
p
 
y0   w0+ (1  p) (z   x)
p
 
y0   x0+ (1  p) (z   w)| {z }
Fs weighted victory gains
:
(ii) (Monetary-dominance) Under dynamic monetary leadership, inationary scal
spillovers onto monetary policy surely do not occur if and only if the ratio of mone-
tary vs scal leadership is su¢ ciently high,
(8)
1R 1
0 (1 RF (t)) dt
> TF =
Ms weighted conict costsz }| {
p
 
b0   a0+ (1  p) (a  b)
p
 
b0   c0+ (1  p) (a  d)| {z }
Ms weighted victory gains
:
(iii) (Regime-switching) If neither of the two conditions (7)-(8) hold then inationary
scal spillovers onto monetary policy may or may not occur in the long-run. Fur-
thermore, deation may occur in the short-run, unlike in the two dominance cases
(i)-(ii), and unlike under static leadership.
Proof. Appendix B presents the proof, and Figure 2 depicts the results graphically. 
Figure 2. The top part shows the monetary-leadershipscal-leadership space under dy-
namic leadership - including the thresholds Ti that separate the three
equilibrium regions. The bottom part shows how our framework nests
the standard timing setups.
To demonstrate the intuition consider the special case p = 1. Specically, focus on the
government being the leader relating to claim (i).19 Solving backwards, the government
knows that through its own inaction it can force the central bank to expand the economy
when the banks revision opportunity arrives. This rewards the government for pursuing
its preferred outcome (PM 0; PM 0;PF 0). Nevertheless, as the initial waiting game is
costly - potentially leading to deation - the governments victory reward has to more
19Obviously, the reviser can never dominate the game, i.e. being the leader is a necessary condition
for a players dominance.
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than compensate its initial cost. Formally, for the government to dominate the game
PF 0 must be the unique best response not only to the simultaneously played PM 0; but
also to AM 0, i.e. it must hold that
w0
Z 1
0
(1 RM (t)) dt| {z }
(AM 0;PF 0): policy conict
+ y0
Z 1
0
RM (t)dt| {z }
(PM 0;PF 0): F victory
> x0|{z} :
(AM 0;PF 0): F surrender
Rearranging this yields the following condition
Fs relative leadershipz }| {
1R 1
0 (1 RM (t)) dt
> TM =
Fs conict costz }| { 
y0   w0 
y0   x0| {z }
Fs victory gain
;
which is the special case of (7) under p = 1. If satised, the central bank will surrender
from the start and there is in fact no conict in equilibrium. The governments threat of
inaction becomes credible, and forces the central bank into a stimulatory action, which
prevents deation.
Formally, the area below the CDFs in Figure 1,
R 1
0 RM (t)dt, over which the govern-
ments victory gain accrues, is su¢ ciently large relative to the conict cost area above
the CDF,
R 1
0 (1 RM (t)) dt. Put di¤erently, monetary policy is expected to be able to
revise quickly, which implies a small potential cost to the government from the conict.
It should now be apparent that if the central bank is the leader, the case of claim (ii),
the TF threshold is just a mirror image of TM . The intuition is simply reversed: it is
now the central bank willing to undergo a costly conict with the government, which
gives the bank an upper hand against the government.
5.4. Game Theoretic Insights. Let us highlight the game theoretic ndings under
dynamic leadership (the macroeconomic policy ndings are discussed in the next sec-
tion). Our analysis renes the results obtained under the simultaneous move and static
leadership.
First, it shows that the leader may not always dominate. This is because its relative
leadership may be insu¢ ciently strong: in the interval 1R 1
0 (1 Ri(t))dt
2 (1; Ti). In fact, the
Regime-switching region may be much larger than the two dominance regions. Second,
the analysis identies several variables that determine the required degree of leadership
for a policy to dominate. In particular, the thresholds TF and TM in (7)-(8) are increasing
functions of the leaders conict costs relative to his victory gain - in Downturn and
Normal times weighted by the probability p. Third, the analysis shows how uncertainty
about the business cycle may relate to the e¤ectiveness of institutional design features
such as an explicit ination target. Specically, if the conict costvictory gain ratio in Downturn
exceeds that in Normal times, which seems to be the case, then both TF and TM are
increasing in p. In such case a higher p increases the size of the Regime-switching
region. It therefore reduces the range of parameters over which the socially optimal
outcomes occur, and deation becomes more likely. These messages are di¤erent from
those obtained under static leadership.
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6. Relating the Analysis and Results to the Real World
This section highlights the linkages between our analysis and the post-GFC economic
environment. It does so more extensively than is perhaps common, but we believe the
challenges facing advanced economies warrant such an increased level of policy discus-
sions. Table 1 summarizes the occurrence of short-term deation and long-term high
ination in the three identied regions.
Equilibrium
region
Monetary vs scal
leadership ratio
Deation in the
Downturn
equilibrium?
High ination in the
Normal times
equilibrium?
Fiscal
dominance
low no yes
Regime
switching
intermediate
possible
its probability is increasing
in
R 1
0 (1 RM (t)) dt and
in
R 1
0 (1 RF (t)) dt
possible
its probability is increasing
in
R 1
0 RM (t)dt and
in
R 1
0 (1 RF (t)) dt
Monetary
dominance
high no no
Table 1. Equilibrium regions and monetary policy outcomes.
In which of these equilibrium regions are real world economies located? How do
changes in the policies institutional design a¤ect their transitions across the regions?
Answering questions such as these is essential for predicting macroeconomic outcomes
and formulating policy recommendations regarding the 2010-2014 period and similar
post-shock periods in the future.
6.1. Interpretation of the Revision Probabilities. Let us start by giving a more
precise real world interpretation to our key institutional concept of dynamic monetary
and scal leadership. Arguably, the players inability to revise their previous stance
relates to constraints placed on the policies by past/present legislation.
The degree of scal leadership naturally increases in the size of the scal gap, which
in turn is determined by legislation relating to mandatory expenditures (e.g. health,
social security, and welfare), taxes (e.g. promised tax cuts), as well as the extent of debt
servicing. The greater the long-term shortfall between future mandatory government
expenditures and taxes, the harder it may be for the government to implement reforms
towards sustainability. Such incapability essentially gives the government the role of a
leader in the game.
Similarly, the degree of monetary leadership depends on the extent to which the
commitment to price stability is grounded in the central bank legislation/statutes. Ar-
guably, monetary leadership is increased when a numerical target for average ination
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and the accountability provisions are legislated. This is because such a transparent ob-
jective cannot be easily reconsidered - due to political, institutional, and reputational
constraints.20
6.2. Quantifying Fiscal and Monetary Leadership. In an attempt to assign real
world countries to the three derived equilibrium regions, this section o¤ers a way of
quantifying the monetary leadershipscal leadership ratio. We develop an index of both institutional vari-
ables based on established indices in the literature. To ensure robustness we average
over a number of existing measures.
In terms of scal leadership, our index is a simple average of eight components based
on: (i) the scal space concept of Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011), (ii) the estimated prob-
abilities of a given scal space by Ostry el al. (2010), (iii) the scal space, scal path,
and scal governance of Augustine el al. (2011), and (iv) average scal balances over
2000-11. For details see Table 2 in Appendix C. In terms of monetary leadership, we use
four components based on: (i) the political transparency measure of Eij¢ nger and Ger-
aats (2006) as calculated by Dincer and Eichengreen (2011), (ii) the nal responsibility
measure of the central bank accountability index of Haan et al. (1998) as updated by
Sousa (2002), and (iii) the ination focus and central bank accountability measures of
Fry et al. (2000).21 For details see Table 3 and for the original data see Table 4, both
in Appendix C.
Appendix C also explains how we adjust for di¤erent units and mean levels of these
measures in order to show not only the institutional ranking of countries, but also retain
the quantitative di¤erences between them implied by the underlying measures. Figure 3
presents our scal leadership scores from Table 6 for the 25 countries for which at least
5 out of the 8 measures have been calculated in the underlying papers. It is interesting
to note the large di¤erences that exist across countries, with the lowest degree of scal
leadership in Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavian countries, and the highest in
Japan and Southern Europe.
Figure 3. Fiscal leadership scores.
20The New Zealand Policy Target Agreement is a good example of such constraints. It implies that
changes to the legislated ination target can only be done infrequently (at pre-specied occasions when
the Governor or government change), and that the Governor of the central bank is personally accountable
for achieving the target.
21We have also considered the monetary commitment index by Freytag (2001), but do not use it
because of its broad focus (it also includes criteria regarding central bank independence, bank super-
vision, exchange rate, and currency convertibility). For the relationship between ination targeting,
transparency, and accountability see e.g. Walsh (2003).
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6.3. Countries and Equilibrium Regions. Using our monetary and scal leadership
scores, Figure 4 o¤ers the monetary vs scal leadership space whereas Figure 5 plots the
leadership ratios. Unlike the former, the latter gure does so only for a subsample of
countries that have an autonomous monetary policy (i.e. neither use nor are pegged to
the Euro) - for reasons discussed in Section 7.
Figure 4. The monetary vs scal leadership space.
Figure 5. The ratios of monetary vs scal leadership scores.
While the ranking of countries in the latter gure can be done with some degree of
condence, assigning countries to our three equilibrium regions, that is, identifying the
exact position of the thresholds TM and TF , is more problematic. As our theoretic
results show, these are a function of a number of (hard to quantify) variables, and we
therefore do not attempt to do so. This is indicated in Figures 4 and 5 by the transition
between the colours being gradual - unlike that of Figure 2. Keeping that in mind, we
will discuss observed developments focusing on two advanced countries from opposite
sides of the monetary leadershipscal leadership space: the United States and Australia.
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6.3.1. The United States. Davig and Leeper (2010) show that the Ricardian regime oc-
curred during 1984-1991 and again during 1995-2001, whereas the non-Ricardian regime
(PM;AF ) prevailed between 2002 and 2008. This is consistent with Li, Li, and Yu (2011)
whose estimates suggest that the Fed has not been adhering to the Taylor principle since
the early 2000s.
In terms of the Downturn scenario, Economist (2011) reports that between mid-
November 2010 and end-March 2011 Americas Treasury has issued some $589 billion
in extra long-term debt, of which the Fed has bought $514 billion. The Economist con-
cludes: In e¤ect, QE ... has been undermined by debt-management policy. This implies
(PM 0; PF 0) in our setting with monetary policy predominantly carrying out the required
stimulus over the 2010-2014 period.
Such observed combination of the (PM 0; PF 0) and (PM;AF ) regimes can, in equilib-
rium, occur with certainty in the Fiscal-dominance region, and with positive probability
in the Regime-switching region. Nevertheless, neither regime can occur in the Monetary-
dominance region. This implies that the monetary leadershipscal leadership in the United States is to the
left of the TF threshold in Figure 5, and possibly also to the left of the TM threshold.
While any such predictions must be made with a great amount of caution, at face
value these outcomes suggest both a positive probability of short-term deation, and
(possibly much larger) probability of long-term high ination in the United States (in
the absence of structural and institutional policy changes). Such conclusion is further
highlighted by the scal policy dead-lock in the U.S. evident during the repeated debt
ceiling negotiations. As a consequence, Feldstein (2012) discusses the Feds exit strategy
consisting of paying interest on banksexcess reserves, and concludes: It will take skill
as well as political courage for the Fed to avoid the rise in ination that the existing
liquidity has created.
6.3.2. Australia. One of the (few) countries that stand in contrast to the U.S. is Aus-
tralia. As an example of a central bank not playing by the governments political play-
book, the Reserve Bank of Australia increased the policy interest rate just seventeen
days before the November 2007 federal government election (at a time when other central
banks were already reducing their rates). Since the mid-1990s, both major Australian
parties have been rmly focused on scal discipline which resulted in virtually zero pub-
lic debt prior to the GFC. There has only been a small increase in debt since then due
to the implementation of scal stimulus packages - that were in 2009 substantially larger
than those in the United States.22
These developments suggest a combination of the (AM 0; AF 0) and (AM;PF ) regimes.
They can, in equilibrium, occur with certainty in the Monetary-dominance region,
and with some positive probability in the Regime-switching region. Nevertheless, nei-
ther regime can occur in the Fiscal-dominance region. This suggests that Australias
monetary leadership
scal leadership ratio is to the right of the TM threshold in Figure 5, and likely also to
the right of the TF threshold.
Remark 2. Based on our theoretic and empirical results, both short-term deation and
long-term excessive ination are more likely in the United States than in Australia.
22Aizeman and Jinjarak (2011) report the 2009 stimuli to be 2.7% of GDP in Australia and 1.8% of
GDP in the U.S.
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6.4. Policy Implications. Our analysis has several policy implications. First, it im-
plies that it is desirable for countries to ensure the Monetary-dominance region in which
both deation and high ination are surely avoided in equilibrium.23 To achieve this over
the full course of the business cycle, i.e. for all values of p 2 [0; 1], the monetary leadershipscal leadership
ratio needs to be su¢ ciently high. It must exceed the TF threshold. Naturally, this
ratio can be increased either through higher monetary leadership (e.g. legislating a nu-
merical ination target and accountability provisions) or through lower scal leadership
(e.g. structural scal reform).
Second, our analysis shows that the implied policy prescription is more nuanced than
just increase monetary leadership and/or decrease scal leadership. The following
remark spells out an implication of Proposition 2 in this respect.
Remark 3. A higher monetary leadershipscal leadership ratio unambiguously improves equilibrium out-
comes if and only if it moves the economy to the Monetary-dominance region. An in-
crease in monetary leadership and/or a decrease in scal leadership that are insu¢ ciently
large may lead to Pareto inferior outcomes.
Paradoxically, if institutional policy changes move the economy from the Fiscal-
dominance region only to the Regime-switching region, there may be no improvement in
the Normal times outcomes (high ination can still occur), there may actually be a wors-
ening of the Downturn outcomes (deation now becomes a possibility). This important
policy warning cannot be obtained from the static Stackelberg leadership framework in
which the Regime-switching region does not exist.
It remains an open question whether the January 2012 move of the FOMC attempting
to increase the degree of the Feds leadership by announcing its 2% ination target may
be a case in point. While making the target more explicit and thus moving to the right
on the monetary leadershipscal leadership axis, it falls short of the degree of monetary leadership delivered
when such an ination target is legislated. It is therefore unlikely to catapult the U.S.
to the Monetary-dominance region given the large size of the countrys scal gap [see
e.g. Kotliko¤ (2006)]. It may in principle only move the U.S. from the Fiscal-dominance
to the Regime-switching region where a short-term policy conict and deation become
more likely.
As a third policy implication, modelling jointly the short-term and long-term horizons
sheds di¤erent light on the two main scal policy prescriptions during 2010-2014, namely
We need more stimulus to boost the economyversus We need immediate austerity to
stop rising debt. Our analysis implies that these two recommendations may not be
contradictory, and that they may both be partly wrong.
Our results indicate that if the probability of the Downturn scenario is high countries
require a combination of short-term stimulus AF 0 (government spending) and long-term
austerity PF (government saving) implemented jointly. In words, there is need for a
credible structural scal reform that eliminates the expected scal gap, which in turn
reduces the concerns of a scal crisis, and hence enables the government to stimulate the
economy in the short-term. This can be through both conventional measures (such as
23This is a normative long-term conclusion that does not necessarily apply in all states of the world.
As we have seen in the Downturn scenario, a slightly higher ination may be the optimal short-term
solution for certain countries in certain situations.
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infrastructure spending) and unconventional measures (issuing more short-term debt).
Such conclusion is in line with Leeper (2011).
Unfortunately, many countries have gone the opposite route. They have ignored the
need for long-term conceptual scal reforms and instead engaged in short-term austerity
measures. Such arbitrary budget cuts however seem to inject uncertainty in the economy
and halt the recovery, increasing rather than decreasing the debt to GDP ratio.
6.5. Empirical Support. Our results are generally consistent with observed develop-
ments and empirical evidence. Most notably, our result that a committed central bank
is more willing to enter in a conict with the government is supported by the estimates
of Franta et al. (2012). Using time varying parameter VARs, the paper shows that
the degree of monetary policy accommodation of debt-nanced government spending
shocks generally decreased post adoption of an explicit ination target (or accommoda-
tion changed to outright o¤setting such shocks by raising interest rates). In contrast, the
degree of monetary accommodation has not changed or even increased in the group of
non-targeters (the U.S., Switzerland, and Japan) over the same period. Figure 6 o¤ers
a sample of the results.
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Figure 6. Impulse responses of the interest rate (vertical axis) to a
debt-nanced government spending shock over the 1980-2007 period in
Australia (left panel) and the U.S. (right panel). For details see Franta
et al. (2012).
Furthermore, the identied disciplining e¤ect of monetary commitment on scal policy
may explain an additional result of Franta et al. (2012) that in all early ination targeters
(New Zealand, Canada, the U.K., Sweden, and Australia) scal outcomes started im-
proving 1-3 years after the adoption of the regime. In contrast, scal outcomes have not
changed or worsened in major non-targeters over this period. Our results indicate this
also: the correlation coe¢ cient between scal and monetary leadership scores is  0:51
(see Figure 4 with the early ination targeters in the bottom right hand corner).24
24It must however be emphasized that these results provide no evidence of causality. There could
in principle be a third common factor responsible for both an adoption of a commitment to an explicit
Monetary Exit and Fiscal Spillovers 20
This is further consistent with the arguments of Brash (2011a,b), the 1988-2002 Gov-
ernor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand that pioneered ination targeting: I have not
the slightest doubt that having legislation which requires government and central bank to
formally agree, and disclose to the public, the ination rate which the central bank must
target has a most useful role in creating strong incentives for good scal policy.
7. An Extension: a Monetary Union
7.1. Three Types of Governments. Our benchmark setup focused on the frequently
studied case of a responsible central bank facing an ambitious government, FA [see Faust
and Svensson (2001) for the terminology]. This meant that we no longer had the mone-
tary and scal symbiosisof Dixit and Lambertini (2003), but a potential coordination
problem and/or outright conict between the policies. This section introduces two ad-
ditional types of government: responsible, FR, and ultra-ambitious, FU . We do so in
the context of a monetary union with a common central bank headed by a responsible
governor as in our benchmark specication.25 But the analysis can also be interpreted
as a single country setting in which the central bank has incomplete information about
the type of government i 2 fA;R;Ug it is facing.26
To allow the latter interpretation and make the analysis illustrative, we will focus
on the case in which the timing of scal moves is the same across the three types of
governments. This seems natural as the principal opportunity of countries to change
their scal stance happens in the annual budget.
Denote the proportion of the FA; FR and FU types of government in the union by
fA; fR and fU respectively, where27
fA + fR + fU = 1:
The overall payo¤ of the common central bank is an average of the payo¤s from interac-
tions with each government type i, using the weights f i. The payo¤ of each government
type is directly determined by its own stance and that of the common central bank. In-
directly, the actions of other governments in a monetary union also have an impact since
they determine the incentives of the common central bank, and hence the equilibrium
outcomes.
7.2. Responsible Fiscal Policymaker. A responsible government is assumed to prefer
the socially optimal outcomes, its payo¤ satisfying
wR > yR > zR > xR and x0R > z
0
R > y
0
R > w
0
R;
ination target and an improvement in the scal balance. Investigation of the political environment at
the time suggests that Canada seems to fall in this category.
25For an analysis of monetary-scal interactions in a currency union see e.g. Kirsanova et al. (2007).
26The policy interaction then features two layers of uncertainty: about economic conditions and the
opponents type. Both of them seem realistic in the post-GFC environment.
27These proportions can express the relative number of such countries, or can be weighted by their
economic size - whichever is more relevant in the particular monetary union. In a single country inter-
pretation, these proportions are the probabilities of the respective governments type as percieved by the
central bank.
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for example
FR
PF AF
M AM
Ricardian
3;3
explosive (tug-of-war)
1; 1
PM
mis-coordination
0; 2
monetization (spillovers)
2; 0
Normal times (responsible F )
FR
PF 0 AF 0
M AM 0
deation
0; 0
recovery
3;3
PM 0
recovery
2; 1
over-stimulating
1; 2
Downturn (responsible F )
We have a symbiosis scenario in both the Downturn and Normal times. This is be-
cause both games have a unique Pareto-e¢ cient Nash equilibrium, consisting of the
preferred outcome for both players and coinciding with the socially optimal outcome
(AM 0; AF 0;AM;PF ). This means that if all governments in the union are responsible
(or, under the single country interpretation, the probability of a responsible government
is unity), this outcome will obtain under all parameter values and any timing of moves.
Put di¤erently, deation, over-stimulating, and inationary scal spillovers never occur
- even if the degree of monetary leadership is low.
7.3. Ultra-ambitious Fiscal Policymaker. We assume that ultra-ambitious govern-
ments are unwilling to coordinate with the central bank. This reects a free-riding
problem in a monetary union, present primarily in small member countries. Intuitively,
the political benets of excessive spending (buying votes) accrue predominantly to the
indisciplined member government itself, whereas the cost (negative externality) in terms
of higher risk and higher interest rates is spread across all union members. Therefore,
if a country only forms a small part of the union, and does not internalize this negative
externality it imposes on fellow members, it may be unwilling (or politically infeasible)
to change its excessive scal stance even if the common central bank is known to be
pursuing AM .28 Formally, the payo¤s satisfy:
zU > xU > wU > yU and y0U > w
0
U > x
0
U > z
0
U ;
for example
FU
PF AF
M AM
Ricardian
3; 1
explosive (tug-of-war)
1; 2
PM
mis-coordination
0; 0
monetization (spillovers)
2;3
Normal times (ultra-ambitious F )
FU
PF 0 AF 0
M AM 0
deation
0; 2
recovery
3; 0
PM 0
recovery
2;3
over-stimulating
1; 1
Downturn (ultra-ambitious F )
Both games have a unique Pareto-e¢ cient Nash equilibrium: (PM 0; PF 0) and (PM;AF ).
These equilibria however do not coincide with the central bankers preferred and socially
optimal outcomes. This means that if all governments in the union are ultra-ambitious,
deation and over-stimulating never occur in the short-term regardless of the degree of
monetary leadership. This is because the common central bank is induced to provide
28This is reminiscent of Greece in the 2001-2008 period. For a formal modelling of this free-riding in
a monetary union see Libich, Savage and Stehlík (2010).
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the required stimulus. Nevertheless, inationary scal spillovers occur with certainty,
and this is true even if the monetary to scal leadership ratio approaches innity.29
7.4. Results. Our setup implies that the preferred subgame perfect equilibrium of FR
is the same as Ms, whereas FU shares its preferred equilibrium with FA. We may
therefore see the common central bank joining forces with the responsible governments
to better deal with the coalitionof the (ultra) ambitious governments. The following
result, a generalization of Proposition 2, indicates which coalition dominates, if any.
Proposition 3. (i) (Ambitious-coalition-dominance) In a currency union, ina-
tionary scal spillovers onto monetary policy surely occur if and only if (7) holds. A
necessary condition for this is that the proportion of responsible governments is
su¢ ciently low
(9) fR < fR =
p(c0   a0) + (1  p)(d  b)
p(b0   d0 + c0   a0) + (1  p)(a  c+ d  b) :
Then and only then deation is surely avoided under all types of government.
(ii) (Responsible-coalition-dominance) In a currency union, inationary scal spillovers
onto monetary policy surely do not occur if and only if the proportion of responsible
governments is su¢ ciently high
(10)
1R 1
0 (1 RF (t)) dt
> TF =
fA [p(b0   a0) + (1  p)(a  b)]
fA[p(b0   c0) + (1  p)(a  d)] + fR[p(b0   d0) + (1  p)(a  c)]  fU [p(c0   a0) + (1  p)(d  b)] :
A necessary condition for this is
(11) fR  fR = f
U [p(b0   a0) + (1  p)(a  b)]  [p(b0   c0) + (1  p)(a  d)]
[p(c0   d0) + (1  p)(d  c)] :
If (10) holds then short-term deation is avoided in countries with responsible and am-
bitious governments, but it surely occurs in countries with ultra-ambitious governments.
(iii) (Regime-switching) If neither (9) nor (10) hold then inationary scal spillovers
onto monetary policy may or may not occur in the long-run. Furthermore, deation
may occur in the short-run under all types of governments.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
The intuition of our benchmark dynamic leadership results carries over. What de-
termines the outcomes is (i) the degree of monetary leadership of the common central
bank relative to the degrees of scal leadership of ambitious governments, (ii) uncer-
tainty about the business cycle p, (iii) the policymakersconict costs and victory gains
in Normal times and Downturn, and also (iv) the proportion of the government types.
29An ultra-ambitious government is more likely in a currency union not only because the common
central bank cannot e¤ectively punish mis-behaving governments, but also because nancial markets
tend to defer their punishment (raising the risk premium) due to the likely bailout by fellow members.
The situation in the Eurozone prior to 2008 can be used as an example.
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7.5. Policy Insights. A contribution of this section is to show how responsible gov-
ernments potentially improve the outcomes of both monetary and scal policies, and
(free-riding) ultra-ambitious governments make them worse. In particular, if countries
with responsible governments make up a large enough part of the monetary union, then
a strongly committed central bank is willing to undergo the conict with the remain-
ing ambitious and ultra-ambitious governments. It knows that ambitious governments
will comply in both the short-term and long-term, and hence the exit strategy will be
successful. Nevertheless, the ultra-ambitious governments will not do so, which will in
such countries lead to a double-dip recession/deation in the short-term, and continued
scal excesses in the long-term. Obviously, this may mean a forced departure of such a
country from the monetary union.
The opposite case is worth emphasizing. If the monetary union is composed primarily
of ultra-ambitious governments (or, in the single country interpretation, the central bank
perceives the probability of the ultra-ambitious government type to be above a certain
threshold), then even an innitely strong monetary leadership may not ensure avoiding
scal ination. Formally, if fR < fR
 
fU

then the TF threshold in (10) does not exist.
Hence even if all types of government can revise their stance instantly,
R 1
0 RF (t)dt = 1,
the conict with the FU government types would be too costly for the central bank. This
means that in Figure 2 there would only be two rather than three equilibrium regions:
the Monetary-dominance region disappears.
It will be interesting to follow the developments in the European monetary union. As
Figure 3 shows, the degree of scal leadership of most of its member countries (including
the large ones) is fairly high. This, combined with the strong legal commitment of the
European Central Bank to price stability, points to the Regime-switching region. In the
Downturn scenario, this region may yield a waiting game with the (AM 0; PF 0) regime
featuring scal austerity, insu¢ cient monetary stimulus, and hence a protracted recession
possibly with deation. This is arguably a description of the 2010-2014 situation in some
Eurozone countries. In the Normal times scenario, the Regime-switching region implies
that above-target ination may occur further down the track.
8. Summary and Conclusions
The post Global nancial crisis situation of continued economic weaknesses combined
with dire long-term scal projections has posed unprecedented challenges for policy-
makers. The paper attempts to provide some insights into the possible macroeconomic
outcomes, and o¤er some policy recommendations - both in a single country and a
currency union setting.
To do so we postulate a game theoretic framework with generalized timing of moves
developed in Libich and Stehlík (2011). This allows us to examine the strategic aspect of
monetary-scal policy interactions, unaccounted for in standard macroeconomic models.
Our analysis provides a link between the short-run (stabilization) considerations and
long-run (sustainability) considerations under incomplete information about the business
cycle conditions.
Allowing for stochastic revisions and asynchronous timing of actions enables us to
postulate the concept of dynamic leadership. It relates to the monetary and scal poli-
ciesinability to alter their previous stance. We show that the outcomes of the policy
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interaction, both short-term and long-term, depend on the relative degree of the policies
leadership as well as business cycle uncertainty, and the central banks and governments
specic preferences. This is because all these variables a¤ect the magnitude of a poten-
tial policy conict in various phases of the business cycle, and hence the policymakers
payo¤s.
In addition to the standard Monetary-dominance and Fiscal-dominance equilibrium
regions of Sargent and Wallace (1981), we identify an intermediate Regime-switching
region in which the intuition di¤ers from conventional results. Most strikingly, deation
can occur in the aftermath of an adverse shock due to a dead-lock (waiting game) between
the central bank and the government. Our results do not only apply to the unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic and scal theory of the price level literatures, but generally relate
to any monetary-scal interaction paper that features a coordination problem and/or
conict between the policies.
In Section 6 we relate our ndings to the real world. We rst quantify the degrees of
scal and monetary leadership in high-income countries, and then match them to the
three equilibrium regions in order to hypothesize about the likely outcomes of the policy
interaction. It is for example shown that, unlike Australia and New Zealand, the United
States are unlikely to be in the optimal Monetary-dominance region. Hence the danger
of both deation in the short-term and high ination in the long-term should not be
underestimated.
The section then o¤ers some policy recommendations to ensure undesirable macro-
economic outcomes are avoided. While more research is required to provide denitive
prescriptions for individual countries, the paper o¤ers a general lesson: monetary policy
may need to be committed very explicitly to a numerical target for average ination to
avoid scal pressures and spillovers. Such legislated target serves as the central banks
credibility insurance over the business cycle. Without strong monetary leadership, the
exit strategy of central banks from the extraordinary stimulatory actions during the
GFC may prove unsuccessful.
Interestingly, we show that such legislated long-term commitment to price stability
may not only improve the outcomes of monetary policy, but also discipline the govern-
ment and lead to superior long-term scal outcomes too. This is because it increases
the chances of a monetary leadership, which reduces the payo¤s of governments from
avoiding required scal reforms.
Let us mention that our monetary leadership concept is compatible with the timeless
perspective commitment of Woodford (1999) or quasi-commitment of Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2007). This is because it does not prescribe (a rule for) how actions need to
be dynamically changed in response to disturbances, it only restricts the frequency with
which the policy stance can be altered. This implies that an explicit numerical target for
average ination does not necessarily reduce the policys exibility to respond to shocks:
for formal modelling of this see Libich (2011), for empirical evidence Parkin (2013).
This is also in line with how central bankers view their job. For example, Brash (2011a)
reects on his experience as the worlds rst ination targeting central bank Governor
as follows: An ination target is only a strait jacket if it is badly designed. All those
with which Im familiar allow for monetary policy to respond exibly and predictably to
exogenous shocks...
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Section 7 extends the analysis to the case of a currency union, and shows that the
disciplining of scal policy through monetary leadership may be ine¤ective against some
(ultra-ambitious) types of governments. These are more likely to appear in a mone-
tary union due to incentives for free-riding by small member countries, and hence such
unions are more susceptible to departures from price stability. Therefore, they need even
stronger checks and balances to prevent scal proigacy.
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Appendix A. Real World Fiscal Stress
The 2011 Global Risks Barometer by the World Economic Forum highlights the con-
sensus on the gravity of the scal problem. It evaluates the main risks facing the world
based on responses from over 500 experts and decision-makers. Out of the 37 economic,
geopolitical, societal, environmental and technological risks, scal crisesare the number
one risk in terms of the perceived nancial losses, and they are seen as very likely to
occur in the next ten years.
It should be stressed that the implemented post-2008 scal stimuli only form a small
part of the observed scal stress facing advanced countries. For example, IMF (2009)
estimated that in G20 countries the average contribution of the GFC to the long-term
scal imbalance was only 10.8% of the contribution of aging populations related fac-
tors. Specically, the paper reports the net present value of the impact of aging-related
spending on scal decits in the order of hundreds of percent of GDP for virtually all
advanced countries. Even in the United States, where the demographic factors are less
unfavourable than the average of advanced economies, Batini, Callegari, and Guerreiro
(2011) estimate that: a full elimination of the scal and generational imbalances would
require all taxes to go up and all transfers to be cut immediately and permanently by 35
percent.30
For illustration of the demographic driving forces the United Nations data can be
used. They show that between 1960 and 2040 the old-age dependency ratio in advanced
economies is predicted to more than triple on average, with most of the rise yet to come.
This implies dramatic increases in the pensioner/worker and total dependency ratios:
30See also Neck and Sturm (2008).
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Figure 7. The total dependency ratio (population aged 0-14 or 65+ over
population aged 15-64) in selected countries, and the mean for advanced
countries. United Nations (World Population Prospects) data, 1960-2010
actual, 2011-2040 forecast.
for the latter see Figure 7. In fact, this does not reveal the full extent of the problem. As
Bongaarts (2004) reports, the actual pensioner per worker ratio in advanced economies
is commonly 50-100% higher than the old-age dependency ratio.31
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Focus on claim (i) whereby F is the leader. Solving by backwards induction,
F knows that when Ms revision opportunity comes up, M will play his static best
response to Fs initial play: both in the Downturn and Normal times. Therefore, for F
to dominate the game and always play PF 0 and AF , it is required that F is willing to
undergo a costly conict with M : both in the Downturn and Normal times. In other
words, both PF 0 and AF have to be the unique best responses not only to PM 0 and
PM respectively, but also to AM 0 and AM respectively. This will be the case if the
subsequent (post-revision) victory gain is su¢ ciently high to compensate F for the initial
31The fact that both advanced and emerging countries such as China face aging populations implies
that the global saving glut situation of the early 2000s is going to get dramatically reversed. More
research is required to examine the many implications for of this for capital and labour markets.
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conict cost. Formally, the following incentive compatibility condition needs to hold:
p
0BBB@
Downturnz }| {
w0
Z 1
0
(1 RM (t)) dt| {z }
(AM 0;PF 0): conict
+ y0
Z 1
0
RM (t)dt| {z }
(PM 0;PF 0): victory
1CCCA+ (1  p)
0BBB@
Normal timesz }| {
x
Z 1
0
(1 RM (t)) dt| {z }
(AM;AF ): conict
+ z
Z 1
0
RM (t)dt| {z }
(PM;AF ): victory
1CCCA >
px0|{z}
(AM 0;AF 0): surrender (Downturn)
+ (1  p)w| {z } :
(AM;PF ): surrender (Normal times)
Rearranging yields condition (7) and proves claim (i). The proof of claim (ii), made under
M being the leader, is analogous due to the symmetry. The proof also implies that unless
both (7) and (8) hold there exist multiple types of subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s,
so neither player dominates. This means that both short-term deation and long-term
inationary spillovers may occur in this intermediate Regime-switching region. 
Appendix C. Quantification of Fiscal and Monetary Leadership
Table 2 summarizes the eight measures of scal leadership that enter our overall index
with equal weights. Measures 1-2 reect past outcomes, measures 3-7 are based on the
projected future outcomes, and measure 8 expresses scal governance, which is their
important determinant. The under-representationof the commonly used measures 1-2
reects the fact that the much larger size of the scal gap appears in the future.
Measure F1 F2 F3-5 F6-8
Measure
name
Fiscal
Balance
Fiscal
Space
Fiscal
Space
Fiscal
Responsibility
Measure
by
IMF
Aizenman &
Jinjarak (2011)
Ostry et al.
(2010)
Augustine et al.
(2011)
Data
period
Average
2001-11
Average
2001-11
Projected
future
Projected
future
Measure
type
Budget
surplus
to GDP
Public debt
to GDP over
tax base
to GDP
Probability of
F space (% GDP)
3. FS > 0
4. FS > 50
5. FS > 100
6. F space 7. F path
% GDP to # years to
debt ceiling debt ceiling
8. F governance
index out of 100
Table 2. Components of our scal leadership index.
Table 3 summarizes the four measures of monetary leadership that enter our overall
index with equal weights. Table 4 reports the data from the papers of Tables 2-3. It
should be said that our ranking of countries is fairly robust to alternative weighting of the
underlying measures due to their positive correlation, see Table 5. Iceland and Hungary
are two non-Eurozone exceptions whereby some of their post-GFC developments may
not be fully captured. A more important exception are countries using (or pegged to)
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Measure M1 M2 M3 M4
Measure
name
Political
Transparency
Final
Responsibility
Ination
Focus
Accountability
Measure
by
Eij¢ nger
& Geraats
(2006)
Haan et al.
(1999)
Fry et al.
(2000)
Fry et al.
(2000)
Quantied
by
Dincer &
Eichengreen
(2009)
Sousa
(2002)
Fry et al.
(2000)
Fry et al.
(2000)
Data
period
Average
1998-2006
2002 1998 1998
Measure
type
index
out of 3
index
out of 6
index
out of 100
index
out of 100
Table 3. Components of our monetary leadership index.
the Euro because they no longer have autonomous monetary policy. For this reason we
have not included these countries in Figure 5, and indicated them in blue in Figure 4.32
To adjust for di¤erent units of the underlying measures we normalize all values on the
[0; 1] interval. For the measures that do not have a natural lower and/or upper bound we
assign the polar values 0 and 1 to the minimum and maximum appearing in our sample.
Table 6 reports the resulting scores, as well as their ratio and country ranking.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Focus on claim (i) in which M is the reviser, and solve backwards. When Ms
revision opportunity arrives his best response to the ambitious governments(PF 0; AF )
must uniquely be (PM 0; PM). Formally, we have the following necessary condition
(12)
p
 
fAc0 + fRd0 + fUc0

+ (1  p)  fAd+ fRc+ fUd >
p
 
fAa0 + fRb0 + fUa0

+ (1  p)  fAb+ fRa+ fUb ;
which, after rearranging, yields (9). Intuitively, the proportion (probability) of the FA
and FU types, relative to the FR type, has to be su¢ ciently high to sway M to comply
with them. If satised, the central bank would choose to go into conict with the FR
government types rather than the FA and FU types to minimize its associated conict
cost. This is despite the fact that the bank is responsible.
Moving backwards, at time t = 0 both the FA and FU types of government have to
play uniquely (PF 0; AF ) in equilibrium, regardless of Ms initial play. For FU this is
automatically satised (as she has a strictly dominant strategy in the underlying game),
and for FA this is - assuming (12) holds - ensured by (7) derived in the benchmark
specication. Then we know that the exit strategy will surely be unsuccessful, asM will
play (PM 0; PM) from t = 0. In terms of claim (ii), M knows that while the actions of
32Our reported scores for these countries, which should be taken with great caution, combine the
values for the European Central Bank (where available, namely measures M1 and M2), and values for
the individual countries (M4). We have excluded measure M3 since it reected the xed exchange rates
within the Eurozone just prior to its inception.
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Measure F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 M1 M2 M3 M4
Australia 0.26 0.66 99.8 99.5 99.5 168 40+ 65.9 3 5 94 83
Canada -0.78 2.09 92.2 92.1 70.3 106 39 51.5 3 4 88 100
Hungary -5.32 1.71 - - - 53.2 12 46.1 2.67 2 19 83
Iceland -0.73 2.28 49.1 44 5.8 17.1 20 20.2 3 4 19 92
Japan -6.7 7.75 0.1 0.1 0.1 49 5 47.2 1.5 3 50 50
Korea 1.63 1.42 100 100 100 124.9 40+ 27.5 3 4 63 83
New Zealand 0.88 1.11 93.3 93 92.1 164 38 68.5 3 4 94 100
Norway 13.19 0.97 100 100 100 171.6 22 47.9 2 5 0 50
Poland -5.08 1.44 - - - 94.9 31 58 2.89 3 94 58
Sweden 0.8 0.69 99.9 99.9 99.9 154 40+ 59 2.44 1 100 83
UK -4.6 2.18 78.1 75.9 8.9 91 27 66.4 3 4 100 100
USA -5.52 3.09 71.8 52.2 1.2 62 16 46 1 2 19 83
Austria -2.28 1.48 97.9 97.8 75.1 76.4 12 67.8 3* 1* - 67
Belgium -1.61 1.93 95.9 89.7 2.9 42.3 8 61.2 3* 1* - 33
Denmark 1.06 0.8 100 100 100 153.1 34 54.7 2 2 - 75
Finland 2.04 0.95 96.2 96 69.3 99.2 13 57.9 3* 1* - 92
France -4.06 1.74 88.7 86.6 12 58.7 15 62.8 3* 1* - 83
Germany -2.46 1.87 93 92.3 35.3 75.7 18 57.4 3* 1* - 17
Greece -7.64 4.21 6.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 45 3* 1* - 33
Ireland 5.2 3.21 66 55.9 1.7 38.1 6 48.4 3* 1* - 83
Italy -3.54 2.67 17.3 1.7 0.2 17.8 7 59.2 3* 1* - 58
Netherlands -1.9 1.46 99.3 99.2 83.1 92.7 12 72.3 3* 1* - 83
Portugal -3.47 2.62 34.4 27.1 0.4 27.8 5 45.1 3* 1* - 83
Slovakia -4.59 1.3 - - - 107.7 33 50.9 3* 1* - 67
Spain -2.5 1.77 69.9 61 1.6 81.5 12 60.7 3* 1* - 83
Table 4. Original values of the underlying measures from Tables 2-3 (-
indicates no data available, for the meaning of * see footnote 32).
FR and FU type governments are independent of Ms actions, the FA types revision
will be the static best response to Ms initial play. Using this information implies that
for M to uniquely play (AM 0; AM) the following incentive compatibility has to hold
fA
n
p
h
a0
R 1
0 (1 RF (t))dt+ b0
R 1
0 RF (t)dt
i
+ (1  p)
h
b
R 1
0 (1 RF (t))dt+ a
R 1
0 RF (t)dt
io
+
fR[pb0 + (1  p)a] + fU [pa0 + (1  p)b] >
fA[pc0 + (1  p)d] + fR[pd0 + (1  p)c] + fU [pc0 + (1  p)d]:
After rearranging, we obtain (10), which is just a generalized version of (8). Equation
(10) suggests that if its denominator is non-positive then the TF threshold does not exist.
This implies the necessary condition (11) and completes the proof. 
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Measure F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 M1 M2 M3 M4
F1 - 0.59 0.57 0.62 0.69 0.63 0.29 -0.07 -0.17 -0.44 0.32 0.32
F2 0.59 - 0.94 0.92 0.70 0.66 0.80 0.20 -0.56 -0.23 -0.25 -0.46
F3 0.57 0.94 - 0.98 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.30 -0.45 -0.19 -0.31 -0.39
F4 0.62 0.92 0.98 - 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.33 -0.54 -0.26 -0.38 -0.35
F5 0.69 0.70 0.79 0.85 - 0.91 0.79 0.26 -0.42 -0.24 -0.32 0.00
F6 0.63 0.66 0.78 0.83 0.91 - 0.69 0.58 -0.28 -0.24 -0.39 0.04
F7 0.29 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.79 0.69 - 0.31 -0.73 -0.14 -0.67 -0.58
F8 -0.07 0.20 0.30 0.33 0.26 0.58 0.31 - -0.09 0.01 -0.66 -0.19
M1 -0.17 -0.56 -0.45 -0.54 -0.42 -0.28 -0.73 -0.09 - 0.49 0.57 0.64
M2 -0.44 -0.23 -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 -0.14 0.01 0.49 - -0.10 -0.01
M3 0.32 -0.25 -0.31 -0.38 -0.32 -0.39 -0.67 -0.66 0.57 -0.10 - 0.57
M4 0.32 -0.46 -0.39 -0.35 0.00 0.04 -0.58 -0.19 0.64 -0.01 0.57 -
Table 5. Cross-correlation of our institutional measures.
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Country Code F leadership M leadership
M vs F leadership
scores
Score Rank Score Rank Ratio Rank
Australia AUS 0.19 24 0.93 2 4.94 1
Canada CAN 0.35 16 0.91 4 2.61 6
Hungary HUN 0.63 7 0.52 16 0.82 18
Iceland ISL 0.70 5 0.71 7 1.01 15
Japan JAP 0.89 1 0.41 20 0.46 24
Korea KOR 0.31 19 0.79 5 2.57 7
New Zealand NZL 0.21 21 0.92 3 4.30 2
Norway NOR 0.18 25 0.47 19 2.68 5
Poland POL 0.49 11 0.72 6 1.46 12
Sweden SWE 0.21 22 0.63 9 3.03 4
UK GBR 0.48 14 0.94 1 1.96 9
USA USA 0.63 8 0.31 25 0.49 23
Austria AUT 0.34 17 0.53 15 1.56 11
Belgium BEL 0.49 12 0.40 21 0.81 19
Denmark DEN 0.23 20 0.48 18 2.13 8
Finland FIN 0.33 18 0.63 8 1.94 10
France FRA 0.48 13 0.60 10 1.24 13
Germany GER 0.43 15 0.33 24 0.77 21
Greece GRE 0.87 2 0.40 21 0.46 25
Ireland IRL 0.65 6 0.60 10 0.92 16
Italy ITA 0.75 3 0.50 17 0.66 22
Netherlands NED 0.2 23 0.60 10 3.05 3
Portugal POR 0.73 4 0.60 10 0.82 17
Slovakia SVK 0.49 10 0.39 23 0.78 20
Spain ESP 0.54 9 0.60 10 1.12 14
Table 6. Our monetary and scal leadership indices and their ratio.
